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Abstract
Proponents of large-scale land investments (LSLI) still promote them as a development opportunity, which can lead,
among other benefits, to job creation and enhanced food security for local communities. However, there is increasing
evidence that these investments often deprive affected communities of their access to land, with multiple negative
impacts on livelihoods, food security and on the environment. This paper relies on empirical data to present an
analysis of LSLI and food (in)security – crucially at the level of individuals in two villages in the Ruvuma region,
Tanzania, over 10 years after the acquisition of village land within the Southern African Growth Corridor of Tanzania
(SAGCOT). We introduce an innovative framework that permits an integration of a rights-based approach with the
Sustainable Livelihoods Framework to explore smallholders’ livelihoods and experiences of food insecurity. Our paper
demonstrates how this integration, along with attention we have given to the FAO’s PANTHER principles, adds the
missing yet crucial dimension of accountability on the part of national governments as duty bearers. Our findings
show that in the case of these two villages, the human rights principles of participation, accountability, transparency
and empowerment are severely undermined, with women bearing the brunt in all these domains. This overall state of
affairs is, we argue, due to inadequate monitoring and evaluation of LSLI processes themselves and low levels of
commitment on the part of institutions in Tanzania to monitor the promises made by investors. This in turn demon-
strates an accountability deficit on the part of duty-bearers within LSLIs, and limited capacity of affected community
members to claim their rights. Individual food insecurity experience in the two communities correlates, among other
characteristics, with lack of land ownership, employment and income-generating activities. The rights-based liveli-
hoods framework applied in this study points to serious deficiencies in the LSLI model as presently endorsed in
SAGCOT, and emphasises the fact that access to land in Tanzania is a precondition for the realisation of the right to
adequate food and thus a critical requirement for achieving and maintaining food and nutrition security. We conclude
by arguing that progressive coalitions within and beyond national states must devise policies and institutions that
empower individuals and civil society actors to make demands on their governments to respect, protect and fulfil their
obligations regarding the legally enforceable right to food.
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In the period following the 2007/2008 global financial crisis,
there has emerged evidence of a ‘global land grab’ (TNI,
2013) and consequent to it, a growing body of research on
large-scale land investments (LSLIs) in Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA). This literature is largely critical of the impact of LSLIs
on livelihoods and food security (Alamirew et al., 2015;
Cotula, 2012). For example, in a cross country analysis of
the impact of ‘transnational land acquisitions on local food
security and dietary diversity’, Müller et al. (2021, 5) found
that land deals in SSA have contributed to food insecurity by
shifting production away from local staples and decreasing
dietary diversity among households in the region. Critics
who cite a mounting number of case-studies, argue that the
economic and speculative value of land in these countries are
prioritised to the detriment of the rights of local communities
including other social and cultural rights attached to land
(Davis et al., 2015; Von Braun, 1995). For example, Bues
and Theesfeld (2012) report that local communities in
Ethiopia were denied their rights to water in favour of a flori-
culture investment because of the investor’s influence on the
local government. Alamirew et al. (2015) and Yengoh and
Armah (2015), examining the impact of LSLIs on food secu-
rity and employment in Ethiopia and Sierra Leone respective-
ly, show that employment opportunities associated with these
investments are both temporary and marginal and that there is
a decline in affected households’ food consumption, attribut-
able to LSLI.
The issues can be more serious than this: Borras Jr. et al.
(Borras Jr et al., 2013, 175) state that there is a ‘blurring of
governance boundaries between sectors of food, energy, cli-
mate change mitigation strategies and commercial com-
plexes’, all posing significant governance challenges in the
regulation of LSLIs. Significantly, the law itself, including
international human rights law, has been criticised as an en-
abler of the commodification of land and labour, exacerbating
the global order’s ‘poverty, dispossession and exploitation’
(Cotula 2020, 475) and increasing the vulnerable status of
customarily held land in many African countries (Alden-
Wily, 2011; Chadwick, 2019). Indeed, governments routinely
mobilise their formal ownership of land within national law to
legitimise LSLIs and promote growth corridors or agricultural
modernisation (Chadwick, 2019; Cotula, 2013), while private
investors (domestic and foreign) maximise national law and
the legal protections provided by international investment law
to acquire land and shield themselves from adverse public
(re)actions and legal contestations (Ferrando, 2014; Jayne
et al., 2016).
Consequently, the weaknesses in global markets and finan-
cial institutions, further exposed by the 2007/2008 financial
crisis and subsequent land rush and food security risks in
many African countries, have variously produced and
deepened a vulnerability context for ordinary citizens. This
has in turn demonstrated the need for policies and institutions
to mitigate and regulate the excesses of market forces (Sama,
2016; Schiavoni et al., 2018). It is for this reason that in 2009,
the former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate
food, De Schutter (2009b), identified and recommended plau-
sible policies focused on the linkages between land owner-
ship, food security, sustainable development and the right to
food (see Kothari, 2006; Miggiano et al., 2010). Indeed, au-
thoritative voices like De Schutter (2011a, 505), have argued
that ‘[g]overnments have obligations that they cannot simply
ignore in the name of attracting capital’ and actively advocat-
ed for rights-based approaches to LSLIs, which we use in
framing this paper.
Research on and the impact of LSLIs remain highly
contested due in part to the lack of accurate data (Edelman,
2013; Locher & Sulle, 2014; Oya, 2013), and due also to
opposing views of different actors (Diao et al., 2018). On
the one hand, advocates for LSLIs, such as governments,
multi-national corporations and institutions such as the
World Bank argue that these investments are a development
opportunity and can boost much needed foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI), increase export revenue, and can lead to food
security, technology transfer and job creation for local com-
munities in developing countries (SAGCOT, 2011; Steffens
et al., 2019; World Bank, 2017). In fact, following the 2007/
2008 crisis, the government of Tanzania and its partners
launched the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of
Tanzania (SAGCOT) as part of the Agricultural Sector
Development Strategy (ASDS) and as a means to stimulate
economic development by attracting multi-national compa-
nies to invest in agriculture (Bergius et al., 2018; SAGCOT,
2011). The SAGCOT provides a platform to galvanise global
investors, multi-national companies, state bureaucrats and
politicians in a grand modernist vision for the transformation
of agriculture (Sulle, 2020, 333). The International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD), the World Bank, the
African Development Bank (AfDB), the European Union
(EU), Irish Aid and the Japanese International Cooperation
Agency (JICA) were the main donors in the ASDS
(SAGCOT, 2011). These partnerships underwrote the launch
of the SAGCOT in 2010 (Bergius et al., 2018; Sulle, 2020).
Kaarhus (2018) provides a detailed account of the develop-
ment of the SACGOT and the role of the Norwegian petro-
chemical company YARA International in promoting com-
mercial agriculture as a growth model in East Africa.
In this sense, the SAGCOT is envisaged by the government
of Tanzania as a means to stimulate economic development by
attracting multi-national companies to invest in agriculture
(Bergius et al., 2018; SAGCOT, 2011). There is no doubt that
these large-scale land deals cannot avoid a certain degree of
enmeshment in local dynamics and micro politics over who
has the right to dispose of land, who is consulted and who
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benefits from sales or transfers of land within rural households
and communities (Sulle, 2020). For example, political contes-
tations around land investments in Tanzania can be traced back
to the 1970s and 1980s following the state-led villagisation
programme (Bryceson, 1980; Nelson et al., 2012). Bryceson
(1980, 557) describes the villagisation programme as a failed
top-down experiment in which the state became the coordinator
in the formation of villages as commodity-producing units.
Arguably, current debates around land dispossession and in-
vestments serve in part to reproduce and extend ongoing de-
bates that form part of Tanzania’s agrarian history (Schlimmer,
2018, 84). This complex history of political contestations in
relation to land investments in Tanzania supports the claim by
Sulle (2020, 337) that the SAGCOT did not start with a tabula
rasa, but builds on existing state-led agricultural investments
and local machinations around land.
LSLIs have been challenged for depriving local communi-
ties of their access to land, causing environmental degrada-
tion, and leading to human rights violations (Baumgartner
et al., 2015; Kanosue, 2015; Schiavoni et al., 2018). This
affects those people most severely who are already
marginalised, worsening existing structural inequalities.
Women, who often depend on marginal land for
supplementing food supplies for their households, especially
certain categories such as widows and single women with
children, but also the elderly in general as well as the youth,
are included here. Proponents of human rights advocate for
improved accountability and transparency in designing and
implementing LSLI schemes. In other words, rural communi-
ties should be better involved in land investment policy design
and implementation (De Schutter, 2009a, 2011b). For this
reason, civil society organisations have contributed to these
debates by proposing actions in the form of voluntary guide-
lines, which primarily focus on improving the governance of
land tenure and agricultural policy in general (see Seufert,
2013). For example, following the increasing interest in land
after the 2007/2008 crisis, the Voluntary Guidelines on the
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and
Forests in the Context of National Food Security were en-
dorsed by the UN Committee of World Food Security in
May 2012 (FAO, 2012). Civil society organisations like Vía
Campesina, the German Catholic Bishop’s Organisation for
Development Cooperation (MISEREOR) and a host of others
like the national farmer’s organisations Mtandao wa Vikundi
vya Wakulima Tanzania (MVIWATA), have contributed to
the peasant resistance against the displacement of rural com-
munities by LSLIs and against the destruction of their liveli-
hoods and cultures (Bernstein & Oya, 2014; Sulle, 2020). .
As already mentioned, the lack of sound data on LSLI is
exacerbated by (i) the reluctance of governments and investors
to reveal information on land-based investments which are
controversially deemed to be proprietary and confidential
(Cotula, 2011), (ii) the varied nature and definitions of
LSLIs (Anseeuw, 2013), (iii) the lack of rigour in research
methodologies (Edelman, 2013; Locher & Sulle, 2014; Oya,
2013), and (iv) the risks involved in researching such a polit-
ically charged phenomenon (Cramer et al., 2015; Talleh
Nkobou, 2020). These challenges and limitations can lead to
what Oya (2013) describes as ‘killer facts’ within LSLI re-
search, or, stated differently, ‘the extent to which data reflects
realities … is questionable’ (Oya, 2013, 505). Further,
Scoones et al. (2013) argue for the need for more research
on the impact of LSLI on local communities whose liveli-
hoods and food security are at stake. Socially marginalised
groups, among others, women and the elderly, are most af-
fected, with data on the gendered impacts of land deals largely
lacking (Behrman et al., 2012; Daley & Pallas, 2014).
While this is not the first study to call for, or to integrate,
human rights with the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework
(SLF) (see Carney, 2003; Lemke& Bellows, 2016), this study
uniquely combines the SLF with the human rights
(PANTHER) principles. PANTHER stands for Participation,
Accountability, Non-discrimination, Transparency, Human
Dignity, Empowerment, and Rule of Law (FAO, 2005), as
will be elaborated in the following section.
The paper has three objectives. First, in addressing concep-
tual and methodological challenges in LSLI research, this paper
sets out to provide a new perspective and approach to research
on LSLI. It does so by developing an innovative rights-based
livelihoods framework. We draw on the right to adequate food,
moving away from a needs-based to an entitlement-based per-
spective of food security. The SLF is used to facilitate the
assessment of livelihood strategies and outcomes in the two
case study communities. Second, within this broader frame-
work, we apply the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale
(HFIAS) (see Coates et al., 2007) to explore the food insecurity
experience of individuals as a livelihood outcome in the context
of LSLI within these case study communities. We do not per-
form a comparative analysis or a ‘before’ and ‘after’ evaluation
of the food insecurity experiences in the community, an option
which was not available to us. Such an approach will require
more data, time, and resources as we have highlighted in the
challenges of conducting LSLI research. We do, however, jux-
tapose a cross-sectional perspective of individuals’ food inse-
curity experiences within these communities against promises
made in investment contracts and policies. This provides valu-
able new empirical data, given that in Tanzania data on the link
between LSLI and individual food insecurity experience has
thus far been lacking. Third, we shed light on whether the
human rights principles of accountability, transparency, partic-
ipation and empowerment were adhered to in the context of the
LSLIs observed here, and especially how relevant local govern-
ment institutions and land management structures affect liveli-
hood strategies in these communities.
In making these contributions, we wish to emphasise the
imperative of bringing greater nuance to the complexities of
Broken promises: a rights-based analysis of marginalised livelihoods and experiences of food insecurity in large-scale land investments in Tanzania
LSLI as a global phenomenon, which affects local actors and
communities in a wide range of ways. We recognise, however,
the inherent difficulties and yet the necessity of doing so via in-
depth, localised and on-the-ground research into this often con-
troversial and polarising area of enquiry, which can place re-
searchers themselves at risk of their personal safety, as has
indeed been experienced by the first author of this paper and
his local hosts (see Talleh Nkobou, 2020). In the next section
we introduce the rights-based livelihoods framework, which
integrates the human rights-based PANTHER principles and
the SLF, placing the elements of the framework in the context
of LSLIs in the two case study communities observed here.
1.1 A rights-based livelihoods framework
In the debates on LSLI schemes, a rights-based perspective has
increasingly been called for, both within policy and academic
research (Busscher et al., 2019; Claeys & Vanloqueren, 2013;
Grajales, 2015). As argued by Scoones (2009, 181), sustainable
livelihood approaches have been criticised for the ‘lack of en-
gagement with processes of economic globalisation’, ‘lack of
attention to power and politics’ and its focus on local level
livelihoods in isolation (also see Lemke & Bellows, 2016).
Our rights-based livelihoods framework focuses on both the
overarching context and conditions for the development of live-
lihood strategies and the resulting livelihood outcomes, such as
food security. This human rights-based approach complements
the SLF by introducing broader political economy debates and
structures of accountability for a more nuanced understanding
of LSLIs across different scales from the local, through the
regional to the global level (Narula, 2013).
To do so, we draw on the widely accepted 1996 World
Food Summit definition of food security as the physical and
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food, at all
times, to meet dietary needs and food preferences for an active
and healthy life (FAO, 1996). However, we extend this defi-
nition by moving from a needs-based to a rights-based ap-
proach, which includes aspects of dignity, acknowledgement
of rights, transparency, accountability, and empowerment
(Mechlem, 2004), as is reflected in the definition of the right
to adequate food (see below). A rights-based approach intro-
duces legally enforceable state obligations within LSLI trans-
actions (De Schutter, 2009a; Narula, 2005). Here, ordinary
citizens are rights holders, and national governments and other
local institutions are the primary duty bearers, with multiple
public and private sector actors also being recognised as duty
bearers (Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004).
General comment (GC) 121 of the UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR 1999) defines
the right to adequate food as: ‘…when every man, woman and
child alone or in community with others, have physical and
economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its
procurement’. In GC 12, para. 7–13, the term adequacy is
particularly significant for the right to food since it serves to
underline availability (dietary and sustainable), accessibility
(economic and physical), and acceptability (consumer and
cultural) of food. For its part, a rights-based approach entails
focusing on those who are most vulnerable, understanding
what causes the vulnerability and changing conditions to im-
prove the situation (Chilton & Rose, 2009).
This means that, as a signatory to the 1966 International
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
other international treaties such as the 1979 Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CDC), and in line with General Comment (GC) 12 of the
CESCR (1999), the Government of Tanzania has the follow-
ing legally enforceable obligations: (1) to respect the right to
food, meaning that it should not interfere with people’s access
to resources necessary for their livelihoods. (2) To protect
against non-state actors (individuals or enterprises) from inter-
fering with the access to productive resources of individuals.
(3) To fulfil, requiring states to adopt appropriate legislative,
administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other
measures towards the full realisation of the right to food
(GC 12, 1999), para 152). The fulfil dimension includes the
sub-dimensions to facilitate, where states should proactively
strengthen people’s access to and use of resources and ser-
vices, and to provide goods and services to those, who for
emergency or non-emergency reasons outside their control,
are unable to obtain them (for example, food assistance).
Noteworthy, however, is Article 2 of the ICESCR, which
obliges states to take steps ‘individually and through interna-
tional assistance and co-operation, especially economic and
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a
view to achieving progressively the full realisation of rights
recognised by the covenant’. Moreover, ‘progressive realisa-
tion’ cannot be treated as a licence to remain passive, and GC
3 of the CESCR (1999) clearly defines the minimum core
obligation of states (De Schutter, 2014, 562). In line with these
normative contents, LSLIs and associated policies should be
implemented in a way that progressively realises the right to
adequate food for ordinary citizens (Narula, 2006, 2013).
As stated earlier, in our analysis we apply the PANTHER
principles, which form part of the FAO’s (2005) Voluntary
Guidelines to support the progressive realisation of the right
to adequate food in the context of national food security
1 UNCommittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR),General
Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food, 12 May 1999, available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838c11.html [accessed 07 March 2020]
2 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General
Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11 of the Covenant), 12
May 1999, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838c11.html
[accessed 07 March 2020]
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(Right to Food Guidelines). Along with legally enforceable
treaties such as the ICESCR, voluntary instruments such as
the Right to Food Guidelines ensure that citizens’ political and
social rights are embedded in political and social policy
(Gready & Ensor, 2005). Authors like Das and Grant (2014)
and Mohr et al. (2016) have used the PANTHER principles to
assess the progressive realisation of the right to adequate food
at the national and sub-national level. In line with Yeshanew
(2014, 4), this research argues that these principles should
govern decision-making, implementation and monitoring pro-
cesses within LSLIs in countries like Tanzania. While we
acknowledge that the PANTHER principles are indivisible,
for the purpose of this study, we pay particular attention to
the following four principles as experienced by individuals in
the two case study communities, which in the context of our
research are understood as follows: (also see Fig. 1):
(1) Participation means ensuring the free, informed and
full involvement of all segments of the population,
including marginalised groups such as women, the
elderly and the youth, in decision-making processes
at all stages of LSLIs. This also involves engaging
in meaningful consultations with relevant state and
non-state actors, including impacted citizens and
civil society groups.
(2) Transparency means adopting a clear and context-
sensitive strategy for communication with citizens and
other stakeholders impacted by LSLIs. This entails free-
ly sharing information about the duties and responsibil-
ities of different actors, rights and entitlements of affect-
ed citizens, and maintaining a two-way communication
between investment-related actors and impacted
communities.
(3) Accountability refers to duty bearers having to ensure
that monitoring and reporting mechanisms, that are in-
clusive and context-sensitive, are put in place within
LSLI schemes. Such tools should contribute to continued
learning about and improvements to the LSLI scheme.
Accessible and confidential grievance and recourse
mechanisms, including pathways for timely responses
to complaints of impacted citizens, should be a critical
part of the governance system within LSLIs.
(4) Empowerment of marginalised and affected citizens
should play a primary role and should be provided to
build resilient livelihoods. Local governments and other
authorities are expected to be supported in implementing
their duties to respect, protect and fulfil the right to ade-
quate food, and building the capacity of affected citizens
to claim their rights. Programmes and policies that pro-
mote LSLI should design and implement inclusive and
Fig. 1 Conceptual framework integrating a human rights-based approach with the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework in the context of large-scale land
investment in the two case study communities. *Adapted from DFID 2001 and SDC 2007
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participatory capacity-building strategies, including im-
proving capabilities to absorb shocks and stressors and to
adapt to new livelihood strategies, e.g., the protection of
workers, and raising awareness of the distribution of
rights and responsibilities within LSLIs.
1.1.1 The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF)
Developed as an intervention planning tool in development
programmes (Chambers & Conway, 1992; Solesbury, 2003),
the SLF has been developed further and adapted to various
contexts, allowing for the assessments of the vulnerability and
capability of households’ assets or resources to cope with
shocks and to develop livelihood strategies based on available
resources (Morse et al., 2009; Scoones, 2009). Scoones (2009,
186) in a critical review of the SLF calls for a livelihood
approach which ‘looks simultaneously at both structure and
agency and the diverse micro- and macro-political processes
that define opportunities and constraints’. In the context of our
research on LSLI and applying a rights-based approach, the
elements of the SLF are understood as follows:
(1) The vulnerability context consists of two components:
external stresses and shocks people are exposed to, such
as climatic and weather events, but also market shocks
such as experienced during the 2007/2008 financial crisis
and the subsequent increased global demand for land
(Deininger et al., 2011). The vulnerability context also
refers to internal stresses and shocks, which are mainly
determined by the capability of individuals to cope with
the loss of productive resources such as land, as well as
to internal dynamics and power relations among diverse
actors within communities. This includes the (in)ability
of individuals to cope with shocks and stresses depend-
ing on the human, physical, natural, social, financial and
political resources (‘assets’) available to them. Access to
these resources largely determines people’s capacity to
diversify their livelihoods and, in line with a rights-based
perspective, to hold state and non-state actors account-
able for the violation of their rights.
(2) Transforming structures and processes refer to institu-
tions, policies and regulations that impact the choices
that individuals make about using their productive re-
sources, and the types and amount of assets or resources
they have entitlements to (Messer & Townsley, 2003, 4).
This component of the SLF focuses on the role played by
institutions and processes, such as the rule of law, in the
realisation of people’s right to adequate food in rural and
urban settings.
(3) Livelihood strategies denote the range of activities and
choices that people undertake or make to achieve certain
livelihood outcomes. In the context observed here, such
goals include the choice to work on large-scale farms, or
to secure alternative pieces of land for farming. The ca-
pability to maintain, uphold and develop livelihood strat-
egies can be a means to achieve alternative livelihood
outcomes (Hall et al., 2015; Scoones, 2009).
(4) Livelihood outcomes are the goals to which people indi-
vidually and collectively aspire as a result of pursuing
their livelihood strategies, for example, food and nutri-
tion security, increased income and wellbeing (Messer &
Townsley, 2003; Scoones, 2009). Here, we are specifi-
cally concerned with the food insecurity experience of
individuals as one of the livelihood outcomes in the con-
text of LSLIs.
Figure 1 illustrates how all elements of the rights-based
livelihoods framework are inter-linked, highlighting those as-
pects in red that are most relevant in the case studies observed
here.
1.2 Case study location
Fieldwork for this paper was carried out in the Ruvuma re-
gion, Tanzania, during a three-week pilot study in December
2017, and fromMay to September 2018. A previous visit was
made by the first author to Ruvuma in 2014, as part of research
conducted for his M.Sc. dissertation. Selected aspects of the
M.Sc. thesis (unpublished) entitled The impact of large-scale
land acquisition on the right to adequate food of small–scale
farmers in Tanzania, were presented at the AFHVS/ASFS
Annual Conference, Chatham University, Falk School of
Sustainability, Food Studies Program Pittsburgh, PA 24th –
28th June 2015 (Talleh Nkobou et al., 2015). This prior
knowledge, familiarity, and our existing relationship with
the national network of small-scale farmers’ groups in
Tanzania, MVIWATA, all helped to facilitate community en-
try, to establish rapport and relationships of trust and to engage
in more sensitive discussions related to livelihoods, food se-
curity and the right to food as addressed in this paper.
Ruvuma is located within the Southern Agricultural
Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT), an area earmarked
for the development of agribusiness partnerships (SAGCOT,
2011). Ruvuma has five districts, with the regional capital
being the municipality of Songea. Two villages (Village 1
and 2) were selected and were anonymised, along with the
names of research participants, to protect their identity. The
Ruvuma River is the primary source of water in this region.
Agriculture, predominantly carried out by smallholders typi-
cally cultivating about 2–5 acres of land, accounts for over
90% of regional food production and employment. In both
villages, the village government is co-led by a chairman who
is elected by the village assembly and a government-
appointed Village Executive Officer (VEO). According to
Talleh Nkobou A. et al.
2018 demographic data obtained from the VEO in both vil-
lages, there are 428 households in Village 1, with a total of
1954 inhabitants (991 male and 963 female inhabitants).
Village 2 is appreciably larger and consists of 821 households
and a total population of 3612 inhabitants (1793 male and
1819 female inhabitants).
A detailed account of the LSLI process in the two case
study communities has been provided elsewhere (Talleh
Nkobou & Ainslie, 2020). For the purposes of this paper, a
brief summary of the history of the LSLIs is set out here. In the
first case study (Village 1) the origin of the LSLI dates back to
1984 when it is claimed by research participants that a group
of male village members acting on behalf of the village agreed
to the transfer of 404 ha of village land to an investor.3 At the
time, land could be transferred by the village government,
who negotiated the transaction, and provided land to anyone.
It is important to understand these transactions within the con-
text of changing legal, political and economic reforms in
Tanzania (Talleh Nkobou & Ainslie, 2020). For example, fol-
lowing independence in 1961, The Land Acquisition Act no 47
of 1967 repealed all colonial land law and vested all land in the
president as trustee. Additionally, the Rural Lands (Planning
and Utilization) Act No 14 of 1973 declared living in villages
as compulsory under the villagisation programme (URT,
1994, 42). Section 4 of the Rural Lands (Planning and
Utilization) Act gave the president ‘unrestricted discretionary
powers to declare any part of Tanzania as a specified area’.
Village held land were (is) registered as ‘rights of occupancy’
and public officials had (have) discretionary powers to ‘re-
voke’ village held land (URT, 1994, 51–57). Subsequent
changes in land law i.e., the 1999 Land Act and the 1999
Village land Act introduced the oversight mechanism of the
village-assembly which obligates the consent for any transfer
of land to a potential investor (for more see Larsson, 2006).
Under the 1999 Village Land Act, a village council is
tasked with making recommendations on any land transfer
and is then supposed to submit a proposal to the village gen-
eral assembly for approval. The same village members who
had agreed to the transfer of land in 1984, some of whomwere
key informants in this research, were shocked when the son of
the deceased investor suddenly claimed an additional 1595 ha
in 2011. The total land he claimed thus constituted an area of
just under 2000 ha and controversially, his claim was support-
ed by local government officials. Several attempts by village
members to contest the acquisition of this additional land
failed, among others holding village assembly meetings,
enlisting local law firms and writing letters to the respective
district officials involved. During the course of these
contestations, some village members were intimidated by the
district commissioner, village executive officer and police,
and some were even jailed. In 2018, while village members
seem to have accepted that their land was taken, they continue
to accuse local government officials of favouring the investor,
to the detriment of their rights.
In the second case study (Village 2), community members
agreed to the very substantial transfer of 20,000 ha of land to a
local investor in 2010. The investor promised to provide farm-
ing tools and tractors, a telecommunication tower, employ-
ment opportunities, schools and a dispensary. However, vil-
lage members have expressed frustration that they were
tricked by a ‘cunning investor’ who gave them 2000Tsh (US
$0.86) each for their ‘voices to be silenced’ (female FGD
participant, Village 2, 04.08.2018). Controversially, village
members have been barred from accessing this piece of land,
which has not been developed since 2010, contradicting the
promises made by the investor at the time of acquisition. In
both case study communities, members reported an abuse of
power on the part of local government representatives and the
consistent disregard of their interests and rights.
2 Materials and methods
Research permits and ethical clearance were obtained from the
Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology
(COSTECH)4 and from the Research Ethics Committee5 at
the University of Reading’s School of Agriculture Policy
and Development, respectively.
2.1 Data collection
The paper relies on both qualitative and quantitative research
approaches. For an initial analysis of secondary data, we drew
on published academic literature, policy documents, civil so-
ciety and media reports as well as on community documents
such as letters and village meeting minutes regarding the land
deal in the two communities.
The study used a two-stage sampling technique. First, two
villages were purposively selected because of their LSLI ex-
periences (as described above). Second, 187 households were
selected using a purposively stratified sample, including an
average of ten households per hamlet in each village (see
Table 1). All adults above 18 years of age in the sampled
households were interviewed (n = 374) using a structured
questionnaire. This typically took 45min to administer to each
person. In doing so, we hold that experiences regarding food
security of each individual within a household must be con-
sidered, as certain voices may be marginalised when only3 The investor was a Tanzanian of Indian origin, who lived in Songea (capital
of Ruvuma, Tanzania) at the time. This reality has informed what is widely
referred to as indigenisation debates in Tanzania (among others, see
Aminzade, 2003, Mwapachu, 2005), which need not concern us here.
4 Ref No.2018–348-NA-2018-06
5 Ref: 00739_14.05.2018
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household heads are consulted, as is still common when
conducting household surveys. The questionnaires were ad-
ministered with the help of two locally-recruited research as-
sistants (one male and one female). Male and female adults
were interviewed separately by the male and female research
assistant, respectively. In doing so, we attempted to minimise
unequal gender dynamics between interviewer and interview-
ee as well as possible power dynamics between household
members, for e.g., husband and wife, by enabling both female
and male household members to share their views. This also
permitted interviewees to speak relatively freely about their
food insecurity experience and livelihood strategies, withmin-
imal influence or pressure by their partner during interviews.
During the period of fieldwork, the first author also engaged in
participant observation which provided additional insights in-
to the everyday experiences of village members.
2.1.1 Focus group discussions (FGDs)
Participants for the FGDs were selected from each hamlet,
with input from the village chairperson. To minimise bias,
each hamlet was represented by one male and one female
participant, who were preferably in the older generation and
with sound knowledge of the village history. To encourage the
participation of women, FGDs were separated into male and
female groups. In Village 1, fourteen participants were split
into two equal groups - seven men and seven women,
allowing us to conduct two FGDs, which each lasted about
two hours. The FGD in Village 2 was limited to one session
with both male and female participants because of the sudden
termination of the first author’s research permit (Talleh
Nkobou, 2020). Focus groups were specifically useful in ex-
ploring the perceptions of village members regarding institu-
tions related to land investments; the role played by key ac-
tors, e.g., government officials in land investments; human
rights and recourse mechanisms, for example the support pro-
vided by the government in case of the violations of rights;
and the gendered implications of the LSLIs.
2.1.2 Key informant interviews
Key informants (n = 18) were selected from a variety of sec-
tors mainly using snowball sampling (see Table 3) in the se-
lected villages and urban areas in Ruvuma and Dar es Salaam.
Initial e-mail contact with an expert in investment and human
rights law at the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM also
acted as the institutional host for the first author) was
established through a purposeful internet search. Key infor-
mant interviews followed a loose ‘schedule of questions’ but
were largely (and deliberately) unstructured. Taking on aver-
age about one hour to conduct, they were especially helpful in
gaining an in-depth understanding of the land acquisition pro-
cess in the case study communities in particular, and the pol-
itics of LSLI in Tanzania more generally.
Table 1 Sample size distribution,
Village 1 and Village 2 (n =
374)
Village Vitongoji (hamlet) Number of households Me (males) Ke (Female) Total population
Village 1 7 112 87 109 196
Village 2 8 75 86 92 148
Total 187 173 201 374
*NB: Not all twelve hamlets in Village 2 were surveyed because of the abrupt termination of the lead author’s
research permit cutting short his work in Village 2
Table 2 The HFIAS occurrence
questions adapted to this study,
based on (Coates et al., 2007)
Item domain (Adequacy) Item domain question (recall period of four weeks)
Anxiety and uncertainty about household food
supply: (Accessibility)
Did you ever worry that your household would not have
enough food?
Insufficient quality - includes a variety of the type
of food and food preferences (Acceptability)
Were you or any household member not able to eat certain
kinds of foods you preferred due to lack of resources?
Did you or any household member have to eat a limited
variety of foods due to lack of resources?
Did you or any household member have to eat some foods
that you really did not want to eat because of lack of
resources to obtain other types of food?
Insufficient food intake and its physical
consequences. (Availability)
Was there ever no food to eat of any kind in your
household because of a lack of resources to get food?
Did you or any household member go to sleep at night
hungry because there was not enough food?
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2.1.3 Household food insecurity access scale (HFIAS)
In line with Coates et al., (2007), De Cock et al. (2013), and
Vogenthaler et al. (2013), we use the food insecurity access
score (FIAS) from the HFIAS as a measure for individual food
insecurity experience. Vogenthaler et al. (2013) use the FIAS
at an individual level, while De Cock et al. (2013) use the
FIAS to measure food insecurity at the household level. By
using the FIAS, we assigned individuals along a continuum
from food secure to severely food secure (see Table 4) over
four weeks during the dry season (also see Vogenthaler et al.,
2013, 1689).
Key informants also contributed to the design, adaptation
and validation of the HFIAS survey instrument. For example,
during the development phase of the HFIAS questionnaire, a
standardised protocol developed by USAID (Coates et al.,
2007) was used to operationalise and translate the question-
naire into the local language Kiswahili with the help of key
informants. Translation into Swahili minimised inconsis-
tencies, which may occur when questions are translated in
an ad hoc manner during interviews. Additionally, to avoid
inconsistencies raised during the piloting phase, three generic
questions in the ‘insufficient food intake’ domain of the stan-
dard HFIAS questionnaire were excluded, while maintaining
all three domains as demonstrated in Table 2. Each item was
asked with a recall period of four weeks.
Knueppel et al. (2010, 365) also found inconsistencies in
the validation of the HFIAS in rural Tanzania, concluding that
there were challenges in separating items in the HFIAS due to
‘the overall high level of food insecurity in the population’.
Leyna et al. (2008) document similar challenges with food
insecurity measures in rural Tanzania.
It should be noted that, of the 18 key informants, only four
were women (see Table 3). There is a striking gender imbal-
ance in the academic sector and in the farmers-based
Table 3 Distribution of prominent community members and key
informants consulted during this study (n = 18)
Stakeholder group Number interviewed (n)
Male Female Total
Farmers-based organisation 3 N/A 3
Academia 3 N/A 3
Civil Society Organisations 3 1 4
State Government representative 1 1 2
Local Government representative 4 2 6
Total 14 4 18
Table 4 Levels of individual food
insecurity access prevalence
status adapted from (Coates et al.,
2007)
Individual food insecurity access
prevalence status (FIAS)
Description
Food secure (FIAS <2) Individuals expressed no concerns about running out of food and did
not have to cut back on the quantity of food. However, because of the
socio-economic realities in these communities, some individuals in
this category worry about dietary diversity.
Mildly food insecure (FIAS <5) Individuals expressed concerns about not having enough food
sometimes or often, and/or were unable to eat preferred foods, and/or
eat a more monotonous diet than desired and/or some foods consid-
ered undesirable, but only rarely. However, to fit into this category,
the individuals did not express cutting back on quantity nor experi-
ence any of the most severe conditions of food insecurity, i.e., run-
ning out of food or going to bed hungry.
Moderately food insecure (FIAS <6) Respondents indicated incidences in which households sacrificed
quality more frequently, by eating a monotonous diet or undesirable
foods sometimes or often, and/or started to cut back on quantity by
reducing the size of meals or number of meals, rarely or sometimes.
However, to fit into this category, the individuals did not experience
any of the most severe conditions.
Severely food insecure: (FIAS ≥6) Respondents described households as cutting back on meal size or a
number of meals often, and/or having experiences of some of the
most severe conditions, i.e., running out of food or going to bed
hungry in any instance during the four weeks. In other words, any
individual that experienced one of these three conditions even once
in the last four weeks (30 days) were considered severely food
insecure.
*These categories can indicate tendencies or broad categories, but are more nuanced in reality, as we describe in
more detail when presenting the results
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organisation in Tanzania. This reflects the low representation
of women in the public sphere in the context of land rights
more generally in Tanzania (also see Duncan & Haule, 2014).
2.2 Data analysis
2.2.1 Measuring food insecurity experience
The FIAS is calculated as the sum of the product of the item
response (xi) and the frequency-of-occurrence response (fi)
across all item domains from the HFIAS for each individual
in Table 2 (Coates et al., 2007). If an item response was ‘yes’
(coded as 1), the frequency of occurrence question was asked
(often = 3, sometimes = 2, rarely = 1). Based on these re-
sponses, the food insecurity access score (FIAS) was calculat-
ed using the following formula (1):
FIAS ¼ ∑6i¼1 xi f ið Þ ð1Þ
If the individual response to all six frequency-of-
occurrence questions was ‘often’, coded as 3, then the maxi-
mum FIAS is 18. If the individual responded ‘no’ to the item
domain questions, frequency-of-occurrence questions were
skipped, and subsequently coded as 0 – with a total minimum
FIAS of 0. The responses on individual food insecurity expe-
riences were then coded and categorised into four levels using
the description in Table 4. Fitawek et al. (2020) use the same
food security categories to explore the effect of LSLIs on
household food security in Madagascar. The results were also
disaggregated by gender, age and education, to investigate the
prevalence in food insecurity experience between these cate-
gories (see Table 5).
2.2.2 Variables associated with food insecurity experience
As mentioned earlier, the FIAS was used as our dependent
variable. To select associated variables linked to individual
food insecurity experience, we used a backward stepwise
Akaike information criterion (AIC) approach (Yamashita
et al., 2007). The model with the lowest AIC was selected.
Results of the regression analysis are included in Table 6.
Variables associated with food insecurity include sex, income,
level of education, land ownership status, livelihood strategy,
amount of daily income spent on food. Authors like Smith
et al. (2017), Wambogo et al. (2018) and De Cock et al.
(2013) have documented these variables as determinants of
food insecurity. The variables also capture the vulnerability
characteristic of individuals in Village 1 and 2.
Qualitative data emerging from focus group discussions,
key informant interviews and observations related to the prin-
ciples of participation, accountability, non-discrimination,
transparency, human dignity, empowerment, the rule of law.
These and other components of the rights-based livelihoods
framework were categorised through identifying emerging
themes and concepts using the qualitative software NVIVO
(Creswell & Poth, 2018). In the next section, we present and
discuss the results of our analysis.
3 Results and discussions
3.1 Socio-demographic and economic characteristics
On average, a household in Village 1 and 2 comprises five
members with a standard deviation (SD) of 4. The average age
of interviewees (n = 374) was 44.7 (SD 14.2). Interviewees
Table 5 Weighted sample
distribution of food insecurity in









Sex Female 200 31% 6% 16% 48%
Male 174 34% 3% 16% 47%
Age group 18–29 75 41% 4% 20% 35%
30–49 184 32% 4% 13% 51%
50–69 91 27% 5% 16% 51%








14 29% 7% 7% 57%
Primary education 306 30% 5% 16% 49%
No education 15 19% 0% 6% 75%
Total 374 33% 4% 16% 47%
n = 374.
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generally fell between the age range of 40–50 years (48%).
The vast majority (85%) of interviewees described their
household as male-headed.6 The daily income of interviewees
was estimated by 82% of respondents themselves as below the
daily minimum wage of 3815.50 Shillings (US$1.65). With
regard to education, 82% of interviewees had primary level
education, 4% had no education, 10% had attended secondary
school, and 4% had received some form of apprenticeship
(e.g. masonry). The low level of education was skewed to-
wards female interviewees, explained by customary practices
which continue to discriminate against women in Tanzania
(Duncan & Haule, 2014). Since the LSLI, the average size
of arable land-holdings of those interviewees who owned land
(19%) in both Village 1 and 2 was reduced to 2–3 acres.
3.1.1 Food insecurity access score as part of livelihood
outcomes
Years after the LSLIs in Village I & 2, village members ex-
perience high levels of food insecurity. A distribution of the
food insecurity access scale across gender, age and education
is represented in Table 5. Based on our calculations of the
FIAS, 47% of interviewees were severely food insecure,
16% moderately food insecure, 4% mildly food insecure,
and 33%were food secure. Even for those in the ‘food secure’
6 This categorisation is often, but not always, linked to decision-making pow-
er, which is further determined by access to resources such as land, social
status, and economic and other contributions. It was not the aim and beyond
the scope of this paper to determine decision-making power, as this warrants
an in-depth analysis of household dynamics and the position and contributions
of the various members.
Table 6 FIAS and associated
food insecurity variables Linear Regression
Dependent variable FIAS
Independent variables Household total, Education primary (=1), Education
secondary (=1), Land before Investments (=1), Work on
LSLI (=1), Other income generating activities, LN (Daily
income), Daily income_ > 3815.50 (=1), LN (income
spent on food), Any land conflict since LSLI (=1), Places
to seek for help (=1)
N 374
Regression Statistics
R 0.42 R-Squared 0.17
Akaike inf. Criterion (AIC) 5.78 AICc 5.78
ANOVA
d.f. SS MS F p value
Regression 11 1382.59 125.69 6.85 1.64E-10
Residual 362 6637.99 18.34
Total 373 8020.59
Coefficients StdErr LCL UCL t Stat p value
Intercept 0.27 8.15 −15.75 16.29 0.03 0.97365
Household total 0.10 0.06 −0.02 0.21 1.67 0.09596
Primary Education −2.24 0.87 −3.94 −0.54 −2.59 0.01007**
Secondary Education −4.27 1.08 −6.39 −2.14 −3.95 0.00009**
Land before Investment 1.95 0.67 0.63 3.26 2.92 0.00374**
Work on LSLI 2.60 0.87 0.90 4.31 3.01 0.00280**
Other income generating
activities
2.83 0.80 1.26 4.40 3.55 0.00044**
LN (Daily income) 1.72 0.78 0.19 3.25 2.21 0.02746*
Daily income >3815.50 −2.28 0.89 −4.02 −0.53 −2.56 0.01083*
LN (income spent on food) −1.54 0.57 −2.67 −0.41 −2.69 0.00749**
Any land conflict since LSLI 1.98 0.58 0.84 3.12 3.43 0.00068**
Places to seek for help 0.74 0.44 −0.13 1.60 1.67 0.09572
T (5%) 1.97
LCL - Lower limit of the 95% confidence interval
UCL - Upper limit of the 95% confidence interval
*0.05 significant level, **0.01 significant level
Broken promises: a rights-based analysis of marginalised livelihoods and experiences of food insecurity in large-scale land investments in Tanzania
category, some respondents expressed that they are sometimes
worried about not having a full diversity of foods at all times.
So, in our research context, a strict application of the definition
of the right to food would result in over 90% of individuals
being categorised as food insecure along the FIAS continuum,
given that no individual should experience any form of food
insecurity (GC 12 of the CESCR 1999).
Considering the harsh socio-economic realities in Village 1
and 2, we categorised those individuals as food secure who
stated that they never ran out of food and did not have to cut
back on the quantity of food (see Table 4). We argue that this
minimalist categorisation in fact shows that the categories of
food security applied here generally have to be regarded with
a degree of caution, especially in contexts where communities
experience high levels of food insecurity (Knueppel et al.,
2010; Saint-Ville et al., 2019).
3.1.2 Determinants of individual food insecurity experience
Because the regression analysis performed in this study focus-
es on the individual level experiences, national-level variables
such as global economic shocks, and other variables that may
explain food (in)security such as climatic condition or season-
ality, soil profile, GDP, and economic development profile of
the country (Baumgartner et al., 2015; Müller et al., 2021)
were not included in the regression model. This explains the
low R-square value of 17%. The R-square value means that
our variables of choice (see Table 6) explain 17% variability
in the food insecurity experience of individuals.
Understanding individual’s food insecurity experiences like
other studies on human behaviour and preferences inherently
have a greater amount of unexplainable variations (Miles,
2005). Yet, the significant coefficients for the variables asso-
ciated with food insecurity in this study such as land and
employment still represent the mean change in the FIAS when
holding other predictor variables in the model constant. The
low R-square value justifies the need for a mixed research
approach in LSLI research which can explain other macro
level variables that impact individual food insecurity experi-
ences and livelihoods.
So, in further explaining the variation in individual food
insecurity, we compensate by triangulating via a qualitative
analysis within the rights-based livelihoods framework. The
framework clarifies the obligations of states at the national
level and the role of local institutions as part of transforming
structures and processes, as well as other components of the
SLF, such as external stresses and shocks. Table 6 presents the
results from the regression analysis. The coefficients of each
variable are of importance here and show how various vari-
ables affect the FIAS (the measure of food insecurity experi-
ence) of individuals within the two communities. The results
in Table 6 are explained along with the qualitative analysis in
the next section.
3.1.3 A rights-based perspective of food insecurity experience
in the context of LSLI
External vulnerabilities and shocks The pressures of the 2007/
2008 financial crisis, the rapid rise in food/cereal prices in
2008/09 and the focus of EU policies on biofuels all encour-
aged multinational corporations to seek cheaper agricultural
land in countries like Tanzania (Cotula et al., 2008;
Giovannetti & Ticci, 2016). Additionally, national policies
and programmes such as the SAGCOT partnership, which
was launched as part of Tanzania’s Agricultural Sector
Development Strategy (ASDS) in 2010, created added incen-
tives for investors to engage in the commercialisation of agri-
culture in Tanzania (URT, 2015). These external drivers cre-
ated shocks impacted upon local communities in a variety of
ways (Nelson et al., 2012; Ngoitiko et al., 2010). According to
research participants in both villages, land conflicts spiked
since 2010 – following the launch of SAGCOT and the in-
creasing interest on the part of outside investors in land in their
communities.
What this demonstrates is how ‘so-called’ external vari-
ables could link with ‘local’ policy implications to accentuate
violations of the right to food for smallholder farmers.
Additionally, the link between local investors and foreign
capital adds to a more nuanced representation of investments
in Tanzania’s history (Nelson et al., 2012; Ngoitiko et al.,
2010). As argued by Sulle (2020, 333), local political elites
welcome large-scale investments because they create rent-
seeking opportunities through lease agreements and accumu-
lating land. Within these LSLI schemes, there is a clear focus
on the part of the Tanzanian government on promoting export-
oriented agribusiness, rather than on adopting long-term eco-
nomic policies and programmes to enhance the productive
capacity and livelihoods of small-scale farmers. For example,
the visit in July 2014 by the first author to Village 1 unexpect-
edly coincided with a visit to the village by the former presi-
dent of Tanzania, Jakaya M. Kikwete. The president praised
the implementation of the large-scale farm, which according
to him, would improve government’s efforts in alleviating
poverty (observation by first author, July 2014).
More recently, however, there is recognition by the gov-
ernment of Tanzania that the focus on large-scale ‘commercial
agricultural has had little impact on poverty reduction and
efforts must be made to address these challenges’ (URT,
2015, 42). And indeed, researchers such as Mbunda (2013)
observe that policymakers did not sufficiently integrate small-
scale farmers into the conception, design and implementation
of the SAGCOT initiative (also see Bergius et al., 2018).
Consequently, there have been regular and worrying reports
on the abuse of human rights, among them the right to ade-
quate food, and discriminatory decisions and policy-making
processes during the implementation of LSLI schemes in
Tanzania (Mousseau & Mittal, 2011; Twomey et al., 2015).
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According to interviewees, the LSLI process in Village 1 & 2
was done in favour of the investors with support from local
government officials, and several promises made by the inves-
tors to local communities have remained unfulfilled.
Similarly, other LSLIs in Tanzania have consistently been
linked to a lack of transparency, unfulfilled promises, corrup-
tion and intimidation of village community members
(Mbilinyi, 2012; Ngoitiko et al., 2010; West & Haug, 2017).
According to observations made by the Committee on
Economic, social and Cultural Rights in the third periodic
review report in 2012 (CESCR, 2012),7 the Committee
expressed concern that:
‘Several vulnerable communities, including pastoralist
and hunter-gatherer communities, have been forcibly
evicted from their traditional lands for large-scale farm-
ing, the creation of game reserves and expansion of
national parks, mining, construction of military bar-
racks, tourism and commercial game hunting. The
Committee [was] concerned that these practices have
resulted in a critical reduction in their access to land
and natural resources, particularly threatening their live-
lihoods and their right to food.’
The absence of adequate legal and institutional mecha-
nisms have contributed to the negative impacts of LSLIs on
the human rights of local communities (Abebe, 2012, 878).
Control mechanisms regarding LSLIs are often ineffective
and transactional procedures inconclusive (Okoth-Ogendo,
1999, 7, Bélair, 2018).
Enhancing livelihood opportunities: Promises and reality The
government of Tanzania describes LSLIs as a development
opportunity that will allow them to increase employment op-
portunities, enable technology transfer, and lead to income
generation and infrastructure development in rural areas
(SAGCOT, 2011). However, in both Village 1 and 2, only
8% of the 374 research participants had gained employment
from the LSLIs. The low rate of employment can partly be
explained by the fact that in Village 2, the investment scheme
has not yet been implemented. Workers on the large-scale
farm in Village 1 are mainly commuting workers from
neighbouring villages, with some of them travelling daily,
while others rent temporary huts from local residents and
share common resources, such as food, and water with their
landlords.
Job opportunities are often seasonal, and workers are
employed informally, on a day-to-day basis, without formal
contracts that would provide them with greater economic and
social security. A representative of the civil society organisa-
tion, Business and Human Rights Tanzania, explained that
investors often rely on intermediaries (known locally as
middlemen8) to provide the labour on the farms. Investors
exploit weaknesses in the labour laws, by ensuring that
workers are not employed for the statutory period of more
than six days per month or a six-months-probation period,9
which would automatically qualify workers to receive several
employment benefits, such as an employment contract and a
fair representation in the case of unfair termination of the
contract. Hence, intermediaries and the investor/manager of
the scheme resort to a day-to-day registration system for their
workers in the LSLI community in Village 1.
Additionally, the lack of access to land increases concerns
and anxiety about not having enough access to food within
both villages, as is expressed in the following statement of a
male research participant:
[Before the arrival of the LSLI], I cultivated 10 acres.
Now, I cultivate five acres because I was robbed of my
land. Now I harvest 50 bags [of maize] while I used to
harvest 200 bags. I' ve reduced the number of kids I used
to live with [sic]. Two went to another village; one went
to work in the garage in town. He does not want to work
in the farm anymore! -Male FGD participant Village 1,
07.07.2018
The long working hours on the LSLI farm in Village 1, ten hrs
per day (07:00–17:00), and the absence of adequate food con-
sumed during working hours partly explain why community
members working on the large-scale farm experience a high
level of food insecurity (FIAS of 2.60), compared to those
who do not work on the farm (see Table 6). The lack of
adequate time to produce one’s own food also explains why
community members who are involved in other income gen-
erating activities have a higher food insecurity experience.
However, from Table 6, those 18% of interviewees who earn
above the minimum daily wage of 3815.50 Shillings ($1.65),
have a lower FIAS of 2.28 compared to those who earn below
the minimum daily wage (82%). Results in Table 6 also show
7 CESCR., 2012. Concluding observations on the initial to third reports of the
United Republic of Tanzania, adopted by the Committee at its forty-ninth
session (12–30 November 2012). Translated by Translator. Number of.
Rome, Italy: Economic and Social Council. Accessed 30.03.2021.
8 The term middlemen is used locally to refer to contractors, or agents who
source for labourers to work on the large-scale farms.
9 Art 14–15 of Employment and Labour Relations Act 2004 - Tanzanian
Labour Law requires that workers should be provided with written employ-
ment contracts at the start of employment except those who work less than six
days in a month for an employer. Article 35 - a worker with less than six
months of employment may not bring an unfair termination claim against
the employer.
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that a 1 % increase of income spent on food reduced the FIAS
by 1.54.
Participants in focus groups and key informant interviews
volunteered that working conditions on the large-scale farm
are not favourable for workers’ health and wellbeing. For
example, workers who are tasked with spraying insecticides
complained about the lack of protective gear, and consequent-
ly that workers experienced burning eyes and sore hands from
repeated exposure to harmful chemicals. Further, there were
reports of sexual abuse by female FGD participants who stated
that to gain employment, farm supervisors, who are mostly
men, ask for sexual favours.
When women go to work, male supervisors ask them for
sex. If they reject [these requests], they do not get the
job. If you do not have sex with them, you' re not
employed. So many people come here from far away
to find jobs on the large farm. Some women have to
agree to give sex bribes because that is the only choice
to secure a job. – (Female FGD participant, Village 1,
21.07.2018)
When a local government representative in Songea was asked
about unfair employment conditions and violation of workers’
rights in the LSLI scheme, he responded that ‘village mem-
bers always complain because they are lazy and are always
expecting handouts from the government’ (Interview,
24.07.2018). Such reasoning fits well with ideas that present
welfare policies as ‘paternalistic’ and people attitudes as lack-
ing entrepreneurial spirit. It highlight the regard of govern-
ment officials as being responsible ‘for’ and not ‘to’ citizens
(Schneider, 2003). As a response to complaints about sexual
exploitation in Village 1, the investor organised sex education
campaigns and distributed free condoms to farm workers,
which was seen by the investor as part of the solution.
3.1.4 Institutionalising the PANTHER principles
TransparencyResearch participants argued that there is lack of
transparency regarding the acquisition process surrounding
the LSLI in the two villages. For example, while members
in Village 1 acquiesced to the transfer of 404.ha of land to
the investor in 1984, there were no subsequent consultations
before the transfer of the additional 1595 ha in 2011. A letter10
from the DC’s office in fact showed that the 1595 ha piece of
land was registered with an ownership certificate in the name
of the investor in 1987, although the authenticity of this doc-
ument could not be determined. FGD participants and key
informants denied agreeing to the transfer of this parcel of
village land in 1987.
These debates must, of course be situated within the
broader history of Tanzania’s complicated and constantly
evolving land reform process. For example, oversight mech-
anisms for the transfer of village land at local government
level were only introduced after land reforms in 1992 and
1999 (Alden-Wily, 2003; Shivji, 2002). In other words, the
village assembly (VA), comprised of all adults living in the
village above eighteen years of age, is the supervisory organ,
while the elected Village Council11 should act an executive
body accountable to the VA (Shivji, 2002). If the village as-
sembly approves and recommends the transfer, the land com-
missioner forwards the approval to the President, who signs
off on the transfer of the village land to private ownership.
After the President’s approval, a 14-day period is provided to
allow for any aggrieved party to lodge complaints before the
final transfer is made.
Tanzania’s has one of the most progressive legal structures
relating to land tenure in Africa, including notional gender
parity in ownership of communal land (Looloitai, 2014;
Nelson et al., 2012). However, while the country’s land laws
have provisions to protect customary rights (German et al.,
2011), and the power to enact and give concrete expression
to these, land laws in Tanzania are in fact still very centralised
(Alden-Wily, 2003; Shivji, 1998). Indeed, the President has
unilateral powers to revoke and convert village land into pub-
lic land in the ‘public interest’ (Alden-Wily, 2012, 755):
' ...[w]here the president is minded to transfer any area
of village land to general or reserved land for the public
interest, he may direct the Minister to proceed in accor-
dance with the provisions... for the purpose of public
interest ' - The Village Land Act, 1999, pp. Part III,
Section 4 (1),(2).
In Village 1, the village assembly was not party to the land
transfer process. Expressing their discontent with the land
acquisition process, FGD participants highlighted that:
We have sent several letters to the district commissioner
' s office, ward secretaries, regional officers, but we
10 Ref: No. AB.81/223/02/95 letter to Village 1 from the District
Commissioner’s office addressing dispute between village members and
large-scale investor.
11 In Tanzania, village leaders (except for the village executive officer, VEO,
who is appointed by the government) are elected by the village residents or
village assembly every five years. This ensures that these leaders are account-
able to the village assembly (Kesale 2017, 5). Hence, the village government
reports to the village assembly and village members, in theory, have the power
to hire and fire village government. However, this oversight mechanism can be
abused by VEOs who might regard themselves as more powerful than the
village government – as is experienced in the case of Village 1, where the
VEO was described by key informants as ‘more influential than the village
chairman’ when the land was transferred to the investor in 2011.
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have received no reply. The Prime Minister came to this
farm in 2018, but we did not get the chance to talk to
him. In 2014, President Kikwete came here; no one was
allowed to speak. These politicians only come here to
speak to the investor and about coffee farming. They do
not listen to the challenges we face from this investment.
– FGD participant in Village 1, 07.07.2018.
The land conflict increases anxiety and concerns over food
availability among village members. This very likely explains
why those involved in land conflicts have a higher FIAS of
1.98 relative to those who are not involved in land conflicts
(see Table 6).
EmpowermentWhile LSLI schemes claim to contribute to the
broader local economy, interviewees argue that they do not
expect any benefits from the investments, as is reflected in the
following statement:
‘We do not have any information[from the district]
about the income generated from the coffee farm. We
don’t benefit from the company! Last year, [we know]
the company paid [some money] to the district, but
where is our village share? (Male FGD participant,
Village 1, 21.07.2018)
It is the case, however, that the influx of migrant workers
provides benefits to residents in Village 1 who resort to
alternative sources of income, such as renting out accom-
modation facilities. Further, there is high production and
consumption of a local brew (wanzuki), which is com-
monly consumed during social gatherings in the evenings.
Additionally, some women sell sweet potatoes along the
main road, while several young men are engaged in
moulding mud bricks for the construction of houses in
the village. It was clear that there is no strategy or pro-
gramme by local government officials to provide alterna-
tive livelihood strategies to build resilient livelihoods
within these communities. Instead, local government offi-
cials refer to village members as being ‘lazy and
expecting government handouts’. On the part of the in-
vestor, apart from distributing condoms, we did not ob-
serve any inclusive programmes that might foster capaci-
ty-building, to help village communities curb the negative
impacts stemming from the LSLI.
In terms of local infrastructure, village members had ex-
pected changes in infrastructure and public services in their
villages as a result of LSLIs. Research participants in Village 1
placed particular importance on road traffic signs, arguing
that: ‘the lack of road signs is proof that we are not important,
and we fear that there are plans by the investor to expand his
land-holding.We even think there are plans to remove us from
this village!’ – (Male key informant, Village 1, interviewed
10.07.2018). Members in this village perceive this as a sign of
neglect on the part of government authorities.
And indeed, in 2017 the investor had a dispensary built in
Village 1. At the time of this study, village members started
advocating for the construction of school infrastructure. The
investor promised to provide financial support for the purchas-
ing of building materials, which cannot be sourced locally,
such as roofing material, cement, and paint, while the local
community committed to providing labour, bricks and other
locally sourced building materials. These fraught and uneven
clientelist type relationships between communities and inves-
tors (Banks et al., 2016) leave one to wonder what the role of
the government is in the provision of these services? For their
part, local government officials were clearly drawn into a
complex web of relationships with the investor, with the in-
teractions between all these parties potentially having a range
of ‘intended and unintended consequences’ (Banks et al.,
2016, 256).
Educational levels in the community remain low, and there
is a need for education provision both for adults and the youth.
The results in Table 6 show that those with primary education
are more food secure, with a lower FIAS of 2.24, relative to
those with no education, and those with secondary level edu-
cation have a lower FIAS of 4.27 compared to those with no
education. Women remain highly disadvantaged, exemplified
by the sexual harassment experienced by them, and higher
levels of food insecurity, as shown in Table 5. Further, women
are not represented in positions of authority, as observed in the
limited number of women who were key informants during
this research.
In Village 2, FGD participants highlighted that none of the
investor’s promises had been fulfilled. We also observed a
lack of empowerment within the LSLI process and among
different actors and institutions in the affected communities.
For examples, legal institutions concerned about the welfare
of the local community have had to close because of the lack
of financial resources needed for land dispute resolution.
Accountability According to information gathered from the
FGDs in Village 1 and 2, village members made efforts to
address the lack of accountability and transparency in LSLI
processes. They repeatedly consulted with Civil Society
Organisations (CSOs), the media and lawyers to facilitate
and support these efforts:
Although we have not succeeded to get back our land,
journalists have helped us understand our rights to
some extent. We found out about human rights by lis-
tening to the radio. Rights should be fought for. If you
fight, you can get it. We have tried by going to lawyers.
A local radio station came here and asked questions,
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what did you do after losing your land?Which problems
did you go through? Then they aired the interviews and
our stories over the radio! (key informant interview with
the Chairman of Village 1 07.07.2018)
To ensure accountability, the functions and tasks of local gov-
ernment institutions need to be clearly defined, regularly
reviewed, and institutional provisions made for adequate
monitoring and dispute resolution mechanisms. In the case
studies observed here, there is a perception among village
members that the state is not willing to take measures that will
firstly, prevent third parties from interfering in the productive
resources of local communities and secondly, institute appro-
priate legislative, administrative, or judicial measures to en-
sure fair access to these resources in local communities. The
following quote from a FGD participant provides a good in-
dication of the broader perceptions of village members:
Unfortunately, the government has not addressed this
issue... I am convinced that the whole government
knows about the land problems in this community.
Because the process of getting our land involved the
regional and district commissioner' s offices, and our
complaints are known from the district level to ministe-
rial level. These people [public officials] have just de-
cided to support the investor by staying quiet about our
problems! – Key informant in Village 2, 04.08.2018.
When respondents in both Village 1 and 2 were asked if they
are aware of official channels via which they could lay land-
related complaints, 73.5% responded ‘no’, while only 26.5%
were aware of some of the procedures, as described by FGD
participants:
When there are land conflicts between village members,
they normally bring them to the chairperson or VEO. If
it is complicated, the conflict is forwarded to Village
land committee and if the Village committee fails, we
forward to the Ward land committee. FGD participant
in Village 1, 07.07.2018.
Our finding corresponds with those of Fernandez and
Schwarze (2013), who argue that there are typically no
tools within land investment schemes to hold investors
accountable for not fulfilling their promises within invest-
ment contracts. Additionally, the financial costs of
defending the rights of local communities are high, and
lawyers are not willing to invest their efforts in land dis-
putes – given that the villagers will struggle to pay their
fees. In an interview with a representative from the
Tanganyika Law Society, he explained that investigating
conflicts around land is expensive, time consuming and
that there is a lack of legal capacity and resources in
Tanzania to dedicate to rural communities. Thus in most
cases, land conflicts are investigated on a pro bono basis.
According to the same representat ive from the
Tanganyika Law Society, many civil society groups are
more interested in tackling issues such as domestic vio-
lence, which can attract funding from the donor commu-
nity and are less resource-consuming and intractable than
land dispute resolution. These factors impact civil society
interests on the continuous monitoring of LSLI deals.
Public institutions such as the Tanzania Investment Centre
(TIC) have been criticised for the lack of follow-up on the
promises made by investors regarding broader economic de-
velopment, which in the case of TIC has been attributed to
both the lack of capacity and of the will to performmonitoring
and evaluation exercises in investment communities (Bélair,
2018, 379). The near-absence of a robust civil society to coun-
ter the negative consequences of LSLIs and to ensure account-
able systems of governance, further weakens the rights of
local communities in Tanzania (Maillard-Ardenti, 2012, 19).
This often means in effect that the efforts made by local com-
munities to defend their rights of access to productive re-
sources can be ignored by those in authority.
Participation FGD participants were asked to share their per-
ceptions of participation in the LSLI process. They generally
defined participation as follows: ‘When the majority agree, it
has to be done. If few are involved and many excluded that is
not participation’ (Focus group, Village 1, 17.07.2018).
Another participant defined participation ‘like eating together.
In any discussion, I should be allowed to speak and be listened
to, and what I say should be considered when taking any
decision’ (Focus group, 17.07.2018). These perceptions and
understandings reflect the concept of participation as applied
in our rights-based livelihoods framework.
Additionally, during the visit of the Prime Minister to
Village 1 in 2018, the village chairman raised concerns about
the lack of transparency and involvement of village members
with regard to the revenue from the farm.
' During an audience with the Prime Minister, before I
finished [expressing our concerns,] the microphone was
taken. When we ask about the proceeds from the inves-
tor, we are silenced or told to go and read the
documents [related to proceeds from the farm at the
district office]. When we ask for the documents [from
the district commissioner], we don' t get them' .
(Interview with chairman of Village 1 07.07.2018).
These quotes illustrate that village members seek to engage
with public officials concerned with LSLIs, but their concerns
are often disregarded by local government officials.
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4 Conclusion
By adopting an innovative rights-based livelihoods approach
which integrates the human rights PANTHER principles and
the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF), this research
reflects recent calls to go beyond a needs-based perspective on
food security. This approach highlights the right to food as a
human right, which empowers individuals to make claims
when their right to food is violated, as can be the case in the
event of LSLIs. A rights-based analysis emphasises that land
in rural Tanzania and elsewhere is not only a key resource for
agricultural production, but a precondition for the realisation
of the right to adequate food and thus a requirement for
achieving and maintaining food and nutrition security. This
perspective, and our approach to the issues, further enhances
the critical need to understand individual experiences by giv-
ing a voice to marginalised groups in society. The rights-based
livelihoods framework applied complements the limitations
identified in using the SLF. It allows for a holistic understand-
ing of the roles of various actors involved in the context of
LSLI and enriches our understanding of the livelihood strate-
gies of and outcomes for rights holders affected by these
investments.
The study further highlights that rights-based approaches
aren’t only reactive (i.e., kicking in when people’s rights have
been violated) but they need to infuse rural development pol-
icies and investment agreements during their formulation and
ensure that processes of free, prior and informed consent and
human rights-impact assessment are carried out. Prior studies
on LSLI in Tanzania have focused on food insecurity at the
level of the household, without extending this to examine
individual food (in)security experiences of members within
these households. The anxiety levels and the experience re-
garding food security of each adult individual within a house-
hold must be considered, as certain voices may be
marginalised when only (male) household heads are
consulted. Whilst we have focused on individuals over the
age of 18 years, it is arguable that future studies should cast
the analytical net even wider to also include the experiences of
children with households. Tellingly though, it is very much
the case that information relating to livelihood strategies of
individual household members could be missed or may re-
ceive little attention if such an analysis is performed without
a gendered interpretation of LSLIs.
The vulnerability of impacted citizens in the case study
communities is exacerbated by the lack of monitoring and
evaluation of LSLI processes, and the lack of capacity and
commitment of institutions in Tanzania to follow-up on the
promises made by investors. This demonstrates a lack of ac-
countability on the part of duty-bearers within the entire LSLI
institutional landscape. Additionally, low educational levels
and limited access to information on the part of community
members restrict their ability to claim their rights. There is a
lack of trust and incentives on the part of community members
to work within LSLI, as they perceive the land acquisition
process to be fundamentally unfair. In fact, citizens who are
impacted by LSLI should be able to participate fully and play
a primary role in building resilient livelihoods within the remit
of these LSLI schemes.
There remains a pressing need, therefore, to understand the
capability of the poor and frequently marginalised groups in
dealing with external shocks and stresses as the starting point
of any intervention. It is equally important to place a context-
specific, case-study-based analysis as presented here, within
the broader context of cumulative macroeconomic effects and
their impact at the local level. The overall and longer-term
contribution of LSLIs to rural development and poverty re-
duction in countries like Tanzania remains questionable, given
the poor integration of the concerns of local communities and
the absence of mechanisms to ensure that investors keep their
contractual obligations. Progressive coalitions within and be-
yond national states must devise policies and institutions that
empower individuals and civil society actors to make de-
mands on their governments to respect, protect and fulfil their
obligations regarding the right to food. They should also be
nudged to ensure the accountability and transparency of gov-
ernment agents and other decision-making bodies and pro-
cesses in implementing such policies.
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